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COVERAGE OF THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
Colden v. Garafalo'
A business may be sold by transferring stock or by transferring assets.
Parties may prefer a stock sale for a variety of reasons, such as securing
more favorable tax treatment2 or maintaining nonassignable leasehold
rights.3 The disadvantage of a stock sale is that the seller must comply with
the registration and anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.4
This disadvantage may be reduced, however, by defining "security"
through a transactional approach. Some courts apply the sale of business
doctrine5 when the primary purpose of a stock sale is the transfer of owner-
1. 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
2. Corporate stock is a capital asset, I.R.C. § 1221 (1976), and a gain on its
sale qualifies for capital gain treatment. Id. § 1201. If a transaction is structured as
a sale of assets, inventory would not be a capital asset under § 1221, and gain on
sale would be ordinary income. Id. § 61(a) (3). Gain on the sale of depreciable busi-
ness assets would also be recaptured as ordinary income. See id §§ 1231, 1245,
1250.
3. See Colden, 678 F.2d at 1140.
4. The federal securities laws referred to in this Note are the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Under these
laws, non-exempt security transactions must be registered. The exemption most
frequently applied to sale of business transactions is the private placement exemp-
tion for affiliates and controlling persons, which requires satisfaction of the many
conditions under § 4(1) and § 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1),
(2) (1976). See generally Vaughn, The Section "4(1 )" Phenomenon: Private Resales of
"Restricted" Securities, 34 Bus. LAW. 1961 (1979). All securities transactions, whether
or not exempt from registration, are subject to the Act's anti-fraud provisions. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
5. See, e.g., Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982); King v. Winkler, 673
F.2d 342 (1 lth Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir.
1981); Frederickson v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017
(1981); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,966, at 96,053 (10th Cir. April 19, 1977); Seagrove Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc.,
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ship from one who has managed the business to a purchaser-operator.
6
These courts label this transaction as a sale of a business and do not apply
federal securities laws. They emphasize the economic realities underlying
the transaction rather than the name of the instrument effecting the trans-
fer. Other courts, however, refuse to recognize the doctrine.
7
In Golden v. Garafalo,8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit declined to recognize the doctrine. The Goldens purchased all
of the stock in a business that they intended to manage personally.9 They
sued Garafalo under the federal securities laws, alleging that he misrepre-
sented the value of the stock. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York applied the sale of business doctrine and
found that federal securities laws did not apply. 0 In reversing the lower
court, the court of appeals found that United States Supreme Court prece-
dent and congressional intent did not support the doctrine. 1 The court
also stated that practicality and policy concerns supported rejection of the
doctrine.'
2
The court of appeals first analyzed the Supreme Court's decision in
United Housing Foundation v. Forman. " In Forman, a stock purchase served as
a recoverable deposit on an apartment. To obtain an apartment, a tenant
was required to purchase a fixed number of shares, transferable at a speci-
fied price only to new apartment occupants or the housing cooperative. 4
These shares lacked the most important characteristics of corporate stock:
534 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Somogyi v. Butler, 518 F. Supp. 970 (D.NJ.
1981); Oakhill Cemetery, Inc. v. Tri-State Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
Zilker v. Klein, 510 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Anchor-Darling Indus. v.
Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D.
Ill. 1981); Dueker v. Turner, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,386, at 97,535 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 28, 1979); Bula v. Mansfield, [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,964, at 96,051 (D. Colo. May 13, 1977).
6. The doctrine has been applied regardless of the business size. See, e.g.,
Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257, 1273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(complex transaction valued in excess of $10,000,000).
7. See, e.g., Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982); Coffin v. Polish-
ing Mach. Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Mifflin
Energy Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Titsch Printing,
Inc. v. Hastings, 456 F. Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F.
Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
8. 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
9. Id at 1140.
10. Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 678 F.2d
1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
11. 678 F.2d at 1143-44.
12. Id at 1142, 1145-46.
13. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
14. Id at 842-43. The tenants did not hold legal title to their apartments, but
the stock entitled them to occupancy rights. Id at 842 n.4. Although it is not clear
why the term "stock" was used, it is often used as a matter of tradition and conven-
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appreciation in value and payment of dividends.' 5 Therefore, the Supreme
Court found that federal securities laws did not apply.
16
The court of appeals in Golden interpreted Forman as requiring a two-
part seriatim test, which first determined whether the instrument consti-
tuted ordinary stock. 7 If the instrument was not ordinary stock, only then
did the analysis question whether the transaction was a security transaction
in economic reality. The court concluded that the instrument was ordinary
stock, and therefore held that the transactional approach did not apply.'
8
The dissenting opinion in Golden, however, stated that nothing in Forman
suggested or required this bifurcated approach.' 9
The confusion stemmed from Formans two-part structure. The
Supreme Court structured the opinion to correspond to the lower court's
two-part decision.20 The court of appeals held on two alternate grounds
that the sale of the housing cooperative stock was a security transaction.
2 1
First, the court found that the sale was a security transaction because fed-
eral securities laws specifically define security to include stock.22 Second,
the court held that the transaction was in economic reality a securities
ience. See P. ROHAN & M. RUsKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW & PRACTICE
§ 2.01(4) (1973).
15. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1982); Golden v. Garafalo,
678 F.2d at 1143.
16. 421 U.S. at 859-60.
17. 678 F.2d at 1144. See also Comment, The Sale of a Close Corporation Through a
Stock Transfer: Covered by the Federal Securities Laws?, 11 SETON HALL L. REv. 749,
757-58 (1981).
18. 678 F.2d at 1144.
19. Id at 1148 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
20. Id The Court indicated that it was responding to the Second Circuit's
alternate holding. 421 U.S. at 851.
21. Forman v. Community Serv., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1250-57 (2d Cir. 1974),
rev'd, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
22. 500 F.2d at 1252-53. "Security" is defined in § 3(a)10 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-
trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit,
for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "secur-
ity"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase,
any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill
of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any
renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976). The definition of "security" in the Securities Act of
1933 is similar. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976).
1983] 1075
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transaction. 23
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. First, the Court found
that the name of an instrument is not dispositive.24 The Court stated that
Congress intended federal securities laws to apply when the economic reali-
ties of a transaction so indicated, rather than when the name of the instru-
ment seemingly dictated.2" The Court also was guided by the principle
that form should be disregarded in favor of economic substance. 26 Despite
this discussion in Forman, the court of appeals in Golden stated that the
Supreme Court did not consider the economic realities of the transaction.
27
At the beginning of the second part of the Foran opinion, the
Supreme Court reexamined economic realities. 2' The Court rejected the
court of appeals' alternate holding that the sale was a security transaction
in economic reality.29 The issue was whether the tenants purchased the
stock with an expectation of profit. Although the court of appeals realized
that there was no profit possible on a resale, it found an expectation of
profit in the form of tax benefits and below-market rental costs.30 The
Supreme Court found that profit was possible, but not expected.3' Because
there was no expectation of profit, the Court held the sale was not a security
transaction in economic reality.
32
Foman did not specifically hold that economic reality is necessary to
determine the security status of conventional corporate stock because the
23. Forman v. Community Serv., Inc., 500 F.2d at 1255. The Second Circuit
stated that an instrument is a security in economic reality when a person invests in a
common enterprise with an expectation of profits derived solely from the efforts of a
promoter or a third party. Id at 1253-54 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 298-99 (1946)). The Second Circuit found an expectation of profits from tax
benefits and a rental charge below the market rate. Id at 1254. Other elements of
the economic realities test were not discussed. See id at 1254-55.
24. 421 U.S. at 848.
25. Id at 849. To avoid the conclusion that any stock is a security, the
Supreme Court reasoned that an instrument might be within the letter of the stat-
ute, yet not within the scope that Congress intended. Id (citing Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
26. 421 U.S. at 848.
27. 678 F.2d at 1144.
28. 421 U.S. at 851.
29. Id at 858.
30. Forman v. Community Serv., Inc., 500 F.2d at 1254. The tax benefit was a
deduction for the pro rata share of the cooperative's mortgage interest payments.
The lower rental rate was partially due to the location of commercial enterprises on
the premises. Id
31. 421 U.S. at 858. Commercial rental income offsetting rental costs was not
mentioned in the cooperative's information bulletin. The commercial enterprises
were established to provide residents with essential services, not to make a profit.
Id at 857.
32. Id at 858. The court noted that purchasing a commodity for personal use
is not a securities transaction.
1076 [Vol. 48
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case did not involve conventional corporate stock.3 3 This does not substan-
tiate the Golden court's contention that the Supreme Court rejected the sale
of business doctrine. Forman supports a uniform transactional approach. 34
The Supreme Court indicated that a securities transaction must involve:
(1) an investment in a common venture, (2) a reasonable expectation of
profits, and (3) income derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial ef-
forts of others.3 5
In Marine Bank v. Weaver,36 the Supreme Court provided additional
support for the sale of business doctrine. Marine Bank involved a six year
certificate of deposit-a note.37 Notes, like stocks, are specifically included
in the definition of a security in the federal securities laws.38 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court held that the certificate was not within the scope of the
federal securities laws; it was unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certifi-
cates to securities laws because deposit holders already were protected by
federal banking laws.
39
Marine Bank implied that Congress did not intend for federal securities
laws to cover transactions otherwise adequately protected;' ° nor did Con-
gress intend for securities laws to provide a federal remedy for all fraud."
The laws were designed to protect investors rather than entrepreneurs.
4 2
The sale of business doctrine follows Marine Bank's limits; the sale of a busi-
33. Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The 'Sale of Business" Doctrine under the
Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637, 665 (1982).
34. Id
35. 421 U.S. at 852. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
36. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
37. Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1982).
38. See note 22 supra.
39. 455 U.S. at 559.
40. Sutter, 687 F.2d at 201; Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Security: Why
Purchasing All of a Company's Stock is Not a Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 225, 252 (1982).
41. 455 U.S. at 556.
42. Sutter, 687 F.2d at 201. See Thompson, supra note 40, at 241. The purpose
of protecting investment interests rather than entrepreneurial interests was reflected
in President Roosevelt's proposal to the Senate for the federal regulation of securi-
ties: "[W]hat we seek is a return to the clearer understanding of the ancient truth
that those who manage banks, corporations, and other agencies handling or using
other people's money are trustees acting for others." 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933).
The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency described the objectives of the
federal securities laws as: (1) to deal with the excessive use of credit for speculation
in the capital markets; (2) to curb the unfair practices employed in speculation in
the capital markets; and (3) to end the secrecy surrounding the financial condition
of corporations that invite the public to purchase their securities. S. REP. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934). The victims of these evils are investors and not entre-
preneurs. Sutter, 687 F.2d at 201. The Supreme Court has also found that the
primary purpose of the federal securities law was to protect investor interests in the
capital market. Forman, 421 U.S. at 849. No court has determined that Congress
1983] 1077
5
Rucker: Rucker: Sale of Business Doctrine:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1983
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
ness to a buyer who intends to manage that business is not a transaction
involving investment interest, and it should not fall within the securities
laws.
After interpreting Forman as rejecting the sale of business doctrine, the
court of appeals in Golden examined two practical considerations. First, the
court cited the problem of distinguishing investment from entrepreneurial
interests as a major reason for rejecting the sale of business doctrine. 43 For
example, purchase of business stock by a buyer who intended to manage the
business would not be within the federal securities laws.44 On the other
hand, a sale to a purchaser who did not intend to manage the business
would be a security transaction because the buyer would rely on the mana-
gerial efforts of others.4 5 Therefore, application of securities laws under the
sale of business doctrine would depend on the buyer's intent.4 6
The court believed that this distinction, based on subjective indicia,
was impractical.4 7 This conclusion is not well founded. First, this distinc-
tion has proved workable in other areas of the law, like section 7 of the
Clayton Act.48 Second, objective factors aid in determining whether a par-
ticular stock purchase was made for investment or entrepreneurial pur-
poses.4 9 These include the percentage of stock owned and acquired by the
purchaser, and the presence of larger blocs of stock held by other sharehold-
ers enabling them to exercise control.5"
Utilization of a legal presumption also supports the distinction. A sale
that gives the purchaser more than 50% of the business is presumed to be
established the federal securities laws to protect entrepreneurial interests involved in
sale of business transactions. See Thompson, supra note 40, at 243.
43. 678 F.2d at 1145-46.
44. The requirement that profits be acquired from the entrepreneurial or man-
agerial efforts of others would not be met. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
45. See Seldin, supra note 33, at 661-65.
46. See id at 660.
47. 678 F.2d at 1145-46.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (exclusion for stock purchased "solely for invest-
ment"). See United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093, 1098-1102
(G.D. Colo. 1979).
49. Thompson, supra note 40, at 258.
50. Other objective factors determining the motivation behind a stock
purchase include: (1) cumulative voting or director classifications that enable less
than a majority of shares to elect members of the board of directors; (2) the percent-
age of stock that has been able to elect a majority of the directors'in the past; (3) the
possibility that cumulative voting or director classifications will permit more than
one person or group to elect the board of directors and prevent any one group from
obtaining a majority and control; (4) the effect of any voting trust or pooling agree-
ment; (5) if control is indicated, whether that control is illusory given the lack of
business expertise; (6) if the possibility of control is indicated, whether the invest-
ment has been marketed in a manner that emphasizes the managerial or en-
trepreneurial efforts of others. Id
1078 [Vol. 48
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entrepreneurial."' The presumption can be rebutted by showing that the
purchaser's primary purpose was investment.52 In Sutter v. Groen, 53 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted such a
presumption.
Another practical problem that disturbed the Golden court was the in-
equity in subjecting only some parties to the same transaction to federal
securities laws, as Canfeldv. Rapp &Son, Inc. 54 illustrates. In Canfield, 75% of
the business stock was owned by Canfield, 20% by Neary, and 5% by
Weber. All of the stock was sold to Rapp. The court found that, in eco-
nomic reality, the transaction was intended to transfer the ownership of a
business to one who would manage it, and Rapp's federal securities law
claim was dismissed. 5 This logic would not necessarily apply to a suit by
the minority shareholders against Rapp or Canfield, for the plaintiff's pri-
mary purpose would not be to acquire or divest control of the business.
5 6
Rather, the passive minority shareolder would sell to maximize his invest-
ment.5 7 Therefore, the sale would be a security transaction in economic
reality.
Although this definition prompted the court to reject the sale of busi-
ness doctrine,5 8 another court and some legal scholars have been willing to
apply this definition under facts similar to Canfield.59 The definition may
51. Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 203 (7th Cir. 1982).
52. Id The presumption operates at this point for two reasons. First, such a
purchase means effective control. The majority shareholder can control most cor-
porate decisions through its directors. Second, the sale of control usually involves a
premium share price. A buyer who does not want control probably would not pay
the control premium. Id
53. 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982).
54. 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981).
55. Id at 468.
56. See Seldin, supra note 33, at 680; Thompson, supra note 40, at 261. The
passive minority shareholder has an interest in an enterprise controlled by another;
he is an investor rather than an entrepreneur. Id See McGrath v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 467-68 n.5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981).
57. Seldin, supra note 33, at 680.
58. 678 F.2d at 1141-42. The court was disturbed with the result obtained
when the sale of business doctrine was applied to a transaction involving the
purchase of all shares of a business from a number of persons, including passive'
investors. The protection of the federal securities laws would extend to the passive
investors who sold the stock, but not to the new manager. Id In Oakhill Cemetery
v. Tri-State Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill. 1981), the court concluded that the
determination of a security must be mutual; it would not be proper to find that
stock is a security for one party but not for other parties to the transaction. Id at
889. Because the plaintiff's claim was dismissed for lack of standing, these remarks
are dicta. Seldin, supra note 33, at 658.
59. See McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 467-68 n.5 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981); Seldin, supra note 33, at 679-8 1; Thompson, supra
note 40, at 261.
1983) 1079
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produce anamolous results, but it reflects the congressional mandate that
the securities laws protect investors rather than entrepreneurs.
60
Finally, the court found that business purchasers need the protection of
the securities laws as much as passive investors. 61 Sale of business transac-
tions, however, do not share two factors that render common law protection
inadequate for security transactions.62 First, the sale of a business is often
direct, so the purchaser and seller are in privity.6' Extension of privity
through the federal securities laws is needed to protect subsequent investors,
but not to protect purchaser-managers. Second, passive investors need
more protection because they can not discover defects in purchases as easily
or as quickly as business purchasers.64 In sale of business transactions, assets
pass to the purchaser, who may examine them and discover any defects.
65
On the other hand, it is much harder for the passive investor to discover
defects in instruments. This inability is caused primarily by the purchaser's
lack of control over the business issuing the instrument.6 6 An investor does
not normally acquire the access to corporate records and assets that the
business purchaser obtains. Thus, an investor needs greater protection from
federal securities law than the entrepreneur who purchases management
control.
The reasons given by the court of appeals in Golden for rejecting the
sale of business doctrine lack support. The Supreme Court's recent deci-
sions imply a foundation for the doctrine. The mandate in Forman is that
60. Sutter, 687 F.2d at 202. The Seventh Circuit has also suggested that the sale
of business doctrine might reduce the costs of administering the federal securities
laws. See id Courts rejecting the doctrine have argued the doctrine would compli-
cate securities law. They contend that courts could no longer apply the laws by
examining only the name of an instrument, fostering increased litigation. On the
contrary, the doctrine might diminish federal securities claims because only true
security transactions would be covered. Savings in administrative costs might occur
because the number of cases applying the more complex securities standard would
diminish.
61. 678 F.2d at 1146.
62. Theoretically, the common law protected purchasers of securities as well as
purchasers of goods. Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227,
229 (1933). Nevertheless, the federal securities laws were an explicit congressional
recognition that common law fraud was inadequate to prevent misrepresentations
in securities transactions. I L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 22 (2d ed. 1961).
Common law fraud is, however, adequate to protect purchasers from misrepresenta-
tions in sales of businesses. Thompson, supra note 40, at 243.
63. Shulman, supra note 62, at 230.
64. Id Investors might also be more susceptible to misrepresentations than en-
trepreneurs are. By renting capital, the investor places his confidence and trust in
the recipient of the capital to act on the investor's behalf. No such trust exists when
an entrepreneur purchases a business. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 858 (purchase of a
commodity for personal use is not a security transaction).
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the courts must evaluate the economic realities of a transaction to deter-
mine whether federal securities law applies. Marine Bank indicates that the
Court is unwilling to cast the federal securities liability net further than
Congress intended. Policy considerations also support the sale of business
doctrine. Investors need the protection of the federal securities law; entre-
preneurs that purchase a business for control or managerial purposes do
not. Therefore, rejection of the sale of business doctrine under the facts in
Golden seems improper. Future decisions should closely analyze Supreme
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